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I. INTRODUCTION
The expansive role which federal law plays in private sector industrial
relations is now and has long since been a fundamental fact of life to
the practicing labor lawyer. Suffice it to say, Wagner, Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin merely furnish convenient, short-hand reminders of the
daily influence which federal law exerts on such diverse subject areas as
employer-union-employee relations, internal union activities, and the
negotiation, interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements. I would like to focus my attention upon a new dimension in
this regulatory scheme, one that perhaps in the long run will prove to be
the most profoundly far-reaching of all federal labor statutes-the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 19701 (hereinafter referred to as
"OSHA").
The search for an appropriate point of departure for this discussion
provides a formidable challenge itself. For those attorneys who have
had the opportunity to become involved in any of the multitude of in-
triguing legal problems relating to the initial interpretation, application,
or implementation of OSHA, there is an almost irresistable tendency to
focus directly on those specific experiences. However, I have opted to
resist this temptation here since it inevitably increases the likelihood of
failing to perceive the forest through the trees, and the OSHA "forest" is
indeed imposing.
What OSHA does, in essence, is to place an estimated four million es-
tablishments engaged in interstate commerce, employing 57 million per-
sons, within the jurisdictional reach of the federal government, acting
through the Secretary of Labor. The Act confers broad authority upon
the Secretary to promulgate and enforce occupational safety and health
standards applicable to all such establishments and, further, to require
employers to furnish places of employment free from "recognized hazards
that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees."
The declared Congressional purpose vividly illustrates the breadth of
the objective sought to be achieved. It goes beyond the bounds of pure
industrial relations, entering into the arena of progressive social reform
"to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the nation
* Member of the Washington, D. C. Bar. This article is an expansion of Mr. Cohen's pre-
sentation to the 1972 Midwest Labor Law Conference in October.
129 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
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safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human re-
sources,"2 which is to be accomplished, inter alia, "by providing medical
criteria which will assure insofar as practicable that no employee will suffer
diminished health, functional capacity or life expectancy as a result of his
work experience. ' 3
Underlying OSHA is the Congressional recognition that to attain this
ambitious goal the authority of the federal government must reach out
into the hitherto untouchable work situs itself. This fundamental policy
decision constitutes a radical departure from the pre-existing status quo:
for characterized most charitably, federal government involvement with
respect to safe and healthy working conditions had been spotty and inef-
fectual.4
This void had not been filled by any satisfactory alternative prior to
OSHA. State workmen's compensation laws at best provide woefully in-
adequate benefit schedules out of touch with present day realities.' More
important, those laws are predicated on the concept of providing after the
fact, out-of-pocket compensation for losses to employees injured in indus-
trial accidents. As such, they fail to come to grips with the worker's acute
needs-affirmative, effective safety programs designed to prevent accidents
and exposure to health hazards.
Second, the process of collective bargaining only produced a variety of
interim stopgap measures. Generally speaking, union efforts at the bar-
gaining table to impose more stringent controls over safety and health have
been beaten back as cost conscious companies continue to guard zealously
their "managerial prerogatives" over these subject areas against erosion
from any source. In any event, even assuming that unions had made more
significant gains, the impact would have been confined to the organized
sector, which reflects only a modest percentage of the nation's overall
workforce.
The stage was thus set for much needed reform. As is so often the
case, the spark which triggered legislative action here was the amalgam
of several compelling, albeit diverse developments: (1) statistics on in-
dustrial accidents and health hazards demonstrated that the country was
on a disaster course of human self-destruction (accident rates had deteri-
orated to the point that 14,000 workers died and 2.2 million were dis-
229 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2) (1970).
329 U.S.C. § 651(b)(7) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
4 See generally BuREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH Acr OF
1970 at 14-15 (BNA 1970). During the course of the debates, Senator Javits (Rep. N. Y.),
one of the leading proponents of the bill, commented that there had been "over 30 years of
utterly dismal performance by the Department of Labor of its safety and health responsibilities
under the Walsh-Healy Act ...." SUBCOML. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE CO . ON LABOR.
AN PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG., 1sT SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF OSHA 194 (Comm.
Print 1971) (hereinafter cited as "LEGIsLATIV HISTORY").
5 See, e.g., THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKbMAN'S COM-
PENSATION LAWS (1972).
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abled each year by accidents in the work place); and (2) as Congress be-
came increasingly conscious of environmental problems resulting from air
and water pollution, a parallel concern about working in a polluted en-
vironment surfaced. The Surgeon General estimated in a 1967 study
of 1,700 industrial plants that 65 percent of the workers were potentially
exposed to harmful physical agents, but only 25 percent were adequately
protected. The study estimated that about 400,000 new cases of occupa-
tional disease would occur each succeeding year. Further,
known hazards went unchecked. Lead and mercury poisoning affected
substantial numbers of workers. Asbestosis, clinically defined over 40
years ago, remained a threat. Allied diseases increased in number. The
danger of byssinosis for workers in cotton mills, recognized in the United
States in the fifties, grew unabated.7
This is not to say that unanimity pervaded the halls of Congress. As
has been true with respect to all major pieces of federal labor legislation,
the statute as finally enacted reflected numerous substantive compro-
mises.8 The compromises were hammered out in the aftermath of the
clash of divergent views strongly held by the opposing forces of labor and
management. The end result of this dynamic political process is self-
evident; the most cursory perusal of the Act by a trained legal mind will
uncover a seemingly endless parade of loopholes and ambiguities. Al-
though some will be discussed herein, no purpose would be served in
chronicling the entire interpretive morass which is our legacy. In passing,
I merely note that the following statement from a recent speech on OSHA
delivered by the minority counsel, Senate Labor and Public Welfare Com-
mittee, is pertinent:
As a participant in the drafting process at every stage, I can assure you
that this law is one of the most carefully drafted pieces of legislation ever
to be enacted by Congress. Every word in the law was carefully and de-
liberately chosen. Incidentally, that doesn't mean there aren't ambiguities
in the law; there are, but most of them are deliberate, rather than the re-
GSee, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857, as amended, 42 U.S.CA. § 1857 (1971); Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
7 THE JOB SAFETY AND HEALTH Acr OF 1970, supra note 4, at 13-14. The true magni-
tude of the industrial environmental pollution problem was eloquently described in the Report
of the House Committee on Labor and Education accompanying H.R. 16785:
More and more nationwide activities are focusing on the "Environmental Crisis"
the pollution of air and water and the destruction of natural resources .... The issue
of the health and safety of the American working man and woman is the most crucial
one in the whole environmental question because it is out of the work place that the
problem of pollution arises; and over 80 million workers spend over one-third of
their day in that environment ....
H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1970); see also S. REp. No. 91-1282,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
8 See, e.g., Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93,99-100 (1958).
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sult of oversight. In Congress, as elsewhere, vagueness is sometimes
preferable to darity.9
One cannot help being impressed by this refreshing ring of candor.
Yet, the message implicit in this statement does not augur well-for the
more ambiguities built into a statute, the greater the likelihood of ex-
tended litigation. I daresay such a development may not be greeted with
overwhelming disapproval by the bar; however, parochial interests aside,
in the area of industrial safety and health which concerns us here, delay
and recalcitrance are uniquely undesirable; they fly directly in the face of
the overriding social objectives of the Act.
II. THE ESSENCE OF THE ACT
A. Structure and Protedure
We turn now to the basic structure of the Act. My comments are in-
tended only as a "bare bones" treatment. The main thrust of the statute,
as noted, is to require employers to comply with occupational health and
safety standards promulgated by the Labor Secretary and to enforce
compliance through the issuance of citations for violations of the stan-
dards, imposition of monetary penalties, and prescription of time sched-
ules for the correction of any such violations (the so-called abatement
period). A supplemental "general" duty is also imposed on employers
to furnish a place of employment free from "recognized hazards."
In view of the preeminent role occupied by "standards," it should be
noted preliminarily that the statute sets forth in painstaking detail a
comprehensive, time-consuming modus operandi designed to insure that
no standard will be promulgated until the Secretary has had the oppor-
tunity to request the assistance and recommendations of an expert, osten-
sibly non-partisan advisory committee, 10 and until all interested per-
sons have had an opportunity to: (1) receive written notice, through the
Federal Register, of the proposed rule; (2) submit written statements of
position and supporting data; and (3) object to a proposed standard, and
request and receive a public hearing on such objections."1 Simply put,
procedural "due process" is guaranteed in the course of promulgating
standards.
Further, any person adversely affected by a standard may petition for
judicial review in an appropriate United States court of appeals within
the 60 day limitation provided in § 6(f).1" The filing of such petition
9 Address by Eugene Mitlemean, Industrial Relations Association of Greater St. Louis Labor-
Management Conference, March 8, 1972.
10 The composition and functions of such advisory committee are discussed in detail in §§
7(b), 6(b) (1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 656(b), 655(b) (1) (1970).
1 Id. § 655.
12 Id. § 655(f). On September 6, 1972, the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, and
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shall not operate as a stay, unless otherwise ordered by the court.'3 On
review, the test for sustaining the Secretary's determination is that enunci-
ated in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB14-"substantial evidence in the
record considered as a whole."
Consistent with the realities of the industrial world, the statute con-
templates that the number of standards which will ultimately be pro-
mulgated will reflect the multitude of existing safety and health hazards
and, further, that periodic modifications, amendments or revocations
will become necessary because of the ever changing environmental condi-
tion of the work place. Likewise, Congress recognized that the Secretary
of Labor, and indeed his entire department, lacked the medical and techni-
cal expertise to conduct research and experimental projects necessary to
identify toxic substances and harmful physical agents-for example, cancer
producing materials-and to develop criteria for use in formulating ap-
propriate occupational safety and health standards in these vital areas. To
fill this void, Congress specifically created the National Institute for Occu-
pational Safety and Health (hereinafter "NIOSH") in the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare. 5 The purpose was to insure that these
critically important functions would be performed by impartial experts
affiliated with the public service who were not dependent upon private in-
dustry for their incomes or research grants." The tremendous breadth of
the charter accorded to NIOSH by OSHA is reflected in the language of
§ 20(a) (3):
[O]n the basis of said research demonstrations, and experiments, and any
other information available . . . [NIOSH] shall develop criteria dealing
with toxic materials and harmful physical agents and substances which
will describe exposure levels that are safe for various places of employ-
ment, including but not limited to the exposure levels at which no em-
ployee will suffer impaired health or functional capacities or life expectancy
as a result of his work experience.'?
numerous affiliated international unions filed a petition for review of the standard for asbestos
dust recently promulgated by Secretary of Labor Hodgson, Civil No. 72-1713, D. C. Cir. (Sept.
6, 1972). This is the first court test challenging the validity of an occupational safety and
health standard and, accordingly, we will have to await the judicial gloss placed on OSHA by
the court of appeals.
is Id.
14 340 U.S. 474 (1950).
15 The Secretary of HEW is authorized to appoint the Institute's Director for a term of six
years and to remove said Director at his discretion pursuant to § 671 (b).
1629 U.S.C §§ 671(a), 669(a) (3) (1970).
1729 U.S.C. § 669(a) (3) (1970) (emphasis supplied). The creation of NIOSH was
the product of Senator Javits' amendment to S. 2193. In explaining the purpose of his amend-
ment, Javits stated:
The establishment of this institute will elevate the status of occupational health and
safety research to place it on an equal footing with the research conducted by HEW
into other matters of vital social concern ....
Equally important, the research and recommendations of the institute will be of
initial importance in continually improving occupational health and safety standards
promulgated under this act. ... (I]t is apparent that the government must develop
[Vol. 33
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The relationship which Congress established between the responsibil-
ity of NIOSH for developing a criteria document and that imposed on
the Secretary for ultimately promulgating a standard is particularly note-
worthy. Section 6(b) (5) directs the Secretary, in promulgating stan-
dards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents, to
set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on
the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer mate-
rial impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has
regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period
of his working life.
Read together, these sections reflect a clear legislative purpose and objec-
tive: to have NIOSH initially develop a criteria document based upon its
research, demonstrations, experiments and other currently available tech-
nical information and, thereafter, to have the Secretary promulgate a
standard based upon those criteria. Significantly, the requirement which
the Secretary must satisfy in promulgating a standard under § 6(b) (5)
of OSHA closely parallels the stated standard for the criteria which
NIOSH is directed to develop, as provided by § 20(a) (3).
More specifically, each is assigned a portion of the task of insuring that
the standard set will guarantee that no employee suffers diminished health,
functional capacity or life expectancy, even if he has regular exposure to
the hazards throughout an entire working life. The only meaningful dif-
ference between their respective mandates is that the Secretary has been
accorded an additional degree of limited discretion. In promulgating a
standard, he must set the most adequate one that is "feasible." '
a capacity for developing these standards which uill operate independently of self
interest groups.
LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 195 (emphasis supplied). Senator Williams (N.J.)
also explained that "the Institute was created in order to give the maximum priority and visibility
to the all-important task of research into these occupational health and safety problems .. [lt
will be a pioneering development if it becomes enacted..." Id. at 434.
IsThe "feasibility" consideration was inserted into the Act by an amendment offered by
Senator Javits to S. 2193, the bill which ultimately became the Senate version of OSHA. In
Senate Report No. 91-1282, accompanying S. 2193, the Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare stated:
On... numerous... issues involved in this legislation the Committee was able to
reach virtually complete agreement. Many of the more difficult problems were re-
solved, and the bill thereby strengthened, through the adoption of amendments of-
fered by members of the minority. Among the more important of these amendments
are the following:
Javits Amendments
4. Feasibility of standards. As a result of this amendment the Secretary, in setting
standards, is expressly required to consider feasibility of proposed standards. This is
an improvement over the Daniels bill which might be interpreted to require absoluts
health and safety in all cases, regardless of feasibility, and the Administration bill
which contains no criteria for standards at all."
Id. at 196 (emphasis supplied). Senator Dominick (R-Colorado) initially voiced his concern
with the proposed language of § 6(b) (5) that required the Secretary to establish standards
which most adequately and feasibly assured to the extent possible that no employee would suffer
1972]
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In structuring the Act, Congress recognized two further practical real-
ities. First, promulgation of the thousands of standards required by OSHA
would be a time-consuming, complex process which could result in fatal
time lags for employees already subject to grave danger from exposure to
toxic substances or physically harmful agents. Second, technical problems
of implementation might arise. For example, because of the unavailabil-
ity of a particular machine or piece of equipment, an employer or perhaps
even several employers might be unable to comply with a newly created
standard when it became effective.
Congress addressed itself to the former problem in § 6(c) (1). It
states that the Secretary
shall provide ... for an emergency temporary standard to take immediate
effect upon publication in the Federal Register if he determines (A) that
employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or
agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards,
and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees
from such danger. 19
any impairment of health or functional capacity of life expectancy even if regularly exposed
to the hazard. He contended that this language "could be read to require the Secretary to ban
all occupations in which there remains some risk of injury, impaired health, or life expec-
tancy .... [Tihe present criteria could, if literally applied, close every business in this nation."
Primarily because of this concern, Senator Dominick offered Amendment No. 1054 to S. 2193
which would have deleted the above stated requirement from § 6(b)(5). Id. at 365-67.
Thereafter, however, Senator Dominick modified his amendment to include exactly the same
language which ultimately was enacted into law as § 6(b) (5). In explaining his change of
position, Senator Dominick engaged in the following colloquy with Senator Williams:
Mr. Dominick: What we are trying to do in the bill ... was to say that when we are
dealing with toxic agents or physical agents, we ought to take such steps as are feasible
and practical to provide an atmosphere within which a person's health or safety would
not be affected.
Mr. Williams: As I understand this amendment, it will provide a continued direction
to the Secretary that he shall be required to set the standard which most adequately
and to the greatest extent feasible assures, on the basis of the best available evidence,
that no employee has continual exposure to the hazard dealt with for the period of his
working life. Certainly that is the objective, and included within this concept of un-
impaired health and functional capacity is protection against diminished life expectancy.
Mr. Dominick: It is my understanding, if I may say so, that what we are doing now is
to say that the Secretary has got to use his best efforts to promulgate the best available
standards, and in so doing, that he should take into account that anyone working in
toxic agents or physical agents which might be harmful may be subjected to such con-
ditions for the rest of his working life, so that he can get at something which might
not be toxic now, if he works in it a short time, but if he works in it the rest of his
life it might be very dangerous; and we want to make sure that such things are taken
into consideration in establishing standards; is that correct?
Id. at 402-03.
19 The emergency standard shall remain in effect until superseded by the promulgation of
a permanent standard, which must occur no later than six months after publication of the
emergency temporary standard under § 6(c) (2). In the interim period, the Secretary is re-
quired to conduct a full scale proceeding for setting a standard; the temporary emergency stan-
dard serves as the Secretary's proposed rule in that proceeding (§ 6(c) (3)).
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To deal with technical difficulties in compliance, Congress created a
mechanism whereby any employer may apply to the Secretary for a tem-
porary order granting a variance from a standard under § 6 (b) (6) (A) .
But in providing a basis for obtaining a variance, Congress took painstak-
ing care to insure that it was not thereby opening the door to abuses of
the fundamental objectives of the Act. To foreclose any such possibility,
the circumstances which justify granting a variance are strictly limited.
Section 6(b) (6) (A) provides that the employer must establish, inter alia,
that: (1) he is unable to comply with a standard by its effective date be-
cause of unavailability of professional or technical personnel or of mate-
rials and equipment needed to come into compliance with the standard
or because necessary construction or alteration of facilities cannot be com-
pleted by the effective date; (2) during the interim, he is taking all avail-
able steps to safeguard his employees covered by the standard; and (3) he
has an effective program for coming into compliance with the standard as
quickly as practicable.20
The actual mechanism for insuring compliance with the "standards" is
the inspection which is conducted under the auspices of the Secretary of
Labor by specially trained and experienced federal personnel. If, after an
inspection has been conducted, the Secretary or his authorized representa-
tive believes that an employer has violated any standard or any of the re-
quirements of the general duty provision, then he is obliged to issue a
written citation, "with reasonable promptness,"2' to such employer describ-
ing the particular nature of the violation(s) committed. "2 The employer
20 
"The economic implications of a standard for an employer are not to be considered in the
determination as to whether a variance is to be allowed." LEGISLATIVE HS'ORY, rupra note
4, at 1201.
21 Section 9(c) also provides for a six month statute of limitations; no citation may be issued
more than six months after the occurrance of the violation. This raises an interesting question
if the violation is "continuing" in nature (e.g., daily emissions into the atmosphere cause a dust
count in excess of the prescribed standard). In those circumstances, it would seem that, at the
very least, a citation is permissible if it refers to the condition in the plant during the six months
immediately preceding the citation date.
2229 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970). The Act also contemplates that there may be situations
in which, upon investigating, an inspector concludes that dangerous conditions or practices exist
at a place of employment which "could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical
harm immediately or before the imminence of such danger can be eliminated through the
[normal] enforcement procedures otherwise provided by [OSHA]." 29 U.S.C. § 662(a)
(1970). To cope with this situation, the statute authorizes the Secretary of Labor to seek in-
junctive relief to restrain any such imminent danger-even if this means closing down an em-
ployer's entire plant operation or a portion thereof until the danger has been abated. Id. Fed-
eral district courts are expressly empowered to assert jurisdiction over such cases and to grant
appropriate injunctive relief under § 12(b).
In assessing the foregoing provisions it should be emphasized that the inspector who observes
the "imminent danger" situation firsthand is not empowered to seek injunctive relief; he can
only recommend to the Secretary who, in turn, must make the final decision whether to pursue
this course of action. However, the statute does contain two safeguards of significance to the
affected employees and their union representatives. First, in circumstances in which the inspector
concludes that an imminent danger exists, he is required to "inform the affected employees and
the employer of the danger and that he is recommending to the Secretary that relief be sought'
1972]
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must promptly post the citation at or near each place a violation referred
to in the citation occurred." In addition, the citation must fix a reason-
able time limit for the abatement of the violation.,2 4  Promptly thereafter,
or in conjunction with the issuance of the citation, the Secretary is also
empowered to notify the employer of the penalty, if any, proposed to be
assessed for such violation.25 In turn, the statute contains a detailed set
of rules2 --perhaps best described as a schedule of maximum monetary
penalties for each violation - which the Secretary can propose 2  and which
the Commission (a three member body completely independent of the
Secretary) ultimately can assess in contested cases.28
The Secretary's citation of violation and proposed penalty shall be
(§ 13 (c))). Second, if the Secretary nonetheless refuses or fails to exercise his authority to
seek injunctive relief, "any employee who may be injured by reason of such failure" or his
representative may initiate a mandamus action against the Secretary in an appropriate district
court to compel him to seek injunctive relief under § 13 (d). The plaintiff in any such action
can prevail only upon showing that the Secretary acted "arbitrarily or capriciously." Id.
However, even under this stringent standard a writ of mandamus should issue unless the
Secretary comes forward with some compelling, objective reasons for failing to heed the recom-
mendation of his technically qualified inspector who personally viewed the employer's premises
and found an imminent danger present.
To insure that employees are in the best possible posture for invoking a mandamus action,
labor unions should notify all local safety committees to request inspectors to issue employers
imminent danger citations before departing their premises. This will obviate any possible dis.
puce as to whether the inspector did or did not orally state that such a situation exists in cir-
cumstances in which the Secretary ultimately determines not to seek injunctive relief.
To date, the imminent danger injunction has been used on just two occasions-after a tun.
nel cave-in resulted in the loss of 22 workers' lives in Port Huron, Michigan, 2 O.S.H. RE3P. 72, at
5004 (BNA 1972), and to restrain construction by Northeastern Contracting Co. (at its Hart.
ford, Conn. job site) of a trench that OSHA alleged was improperly shored, 2 O.S.H. Rip 72, at
388 (BNA 1972). Whether this reflects lack of aggressive enforcement on the part of the
Secretary or the fact that employers are promptly abating all imminent danger situations called
to their attention by inspectors is a subject about which one can only speculate at this time.
Hopefully, the Secretary will report in detail his actual experiences under the imminent danger
provision of OSHA in the near future. Absent such documentation, we are hardpressed to
understand why this statutory provision has not been utilized much more frequently.
23 Id. § 659(b). 29 C.F.R. § 1903.16 (1972) gives a detailed breakdown of the ground





27 Note that the variations in the penalty schedules reflect such distinctions as "serious"
versus "non-serious" violations in § 17(k); willful or repeated versus occasional and uninten-
tional violations in § 17 (a); and cases in which willful violation causes death to an employee
in § 17(e).
28 Id. § 666(j), which provides:
The Commission shall have authority to assess all civil penalties provided in this sec-
tion, giving due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to
the size of the business of the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation,
the good faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations.
For an insight into the manner in which the Commission has interpreted and applied this pen-
alty provision, see, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Nacirema Operating Co., 2 O.S.H. R13P. 77, at 1001
(BNA 1972) ("the four criteria to be considered in assessing peralties cannot always be given
equal weight"); Secretary of Labor v. Hidden Valley Corp. of Va., 2 O.S.H. RBP. 72, at 1004
(BNA 1972).
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deemed a final and unreviewable order, unless within 15 working days up-
on receipt of the notice an employer advises the Secretary (and the em-
ployee representative) that he wishes to contest either of his determina-
tions.2 9  No contest was filed in 95 percent of the more than 30,000 en-
forcement actions initiated through August, 1972.' The filing of a timely
notice of contest will automatically set in motion an extensive quasi-judi-
cial proceeding in which the Secretary carries the burden of proof.3 In
such a case, the independent Commission assigns one of its hearing ex-
aminers32 to conduct an evidentiary hearing which culminates, much
like a federal district court proceeding, in findings of fact, conclusions of
law and an order affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary's citation
or proposed penalty, or directing other appropriate relief.' Any person
adversely affected by an order may petition3 4 to invoke the Commission's
discretionary review authority. 35 Not surprisingly, to date the Commis-
sion (hereinafter "OSHRC") has exercised its discretionary power to re-
view in only six percent of the decisions filed by its judges.30 Even if an
adversely affected party does not prevail before the OSHRC (either because
its petition for review is denied or the Commission reaches the merits and
sustains the examiner's order) then judicial review before an appropri-
2 9 We assume here that neither the employee nor the employee representative has opted to
exercise his right to contest the reasonableness of the abatement period fixed by the Secretary
in the citation, as provided in § 20(c); if the latter occurs, this triggers a review proceeding be-
fore the Commission, including an evidentiary hearing before an examiner. Read literally, §
20(c) limits the right of an employee or a union to file a notice of contest to those situations
in which it is alleged that "the period of time fixed in the citation for the abatement of the viola-
tion is unreasonable." In Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., Dock. No.
562, OSH Rev. Comm. (filed March 1, 1972), the Commission is presently considering the
union's contention that under § 20(c) its jurisdiction also extends to cases where the union's
challenge is not directed at the reasonableness of the abatement period set forth on the face of
the citation, but rather at the fact that the violation was not abated within that period.
3 0 Address by Chairman Robert D. Moran, American Bar Association Labor Law Section
Meeting, August 15, 1972.
31 See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (1972) (OSHRC Rules of Procedure; iee also 29 C..R.
§§ 2200.1-.110 (revised Rules of Procedure effective Sept. 28, 1972).
3 2 Now fully clothed with the title of "judge" by Commission fiat under 5 U.S.C. § 5105 (c)
(1970).
2329 U.S.C. §§ 659(c), 661(j) (1970). The similarity between an OSHR proceeding
and standard practice in federal district court at the pre-trial discovery stage is likewise apparent.
See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.51, .52, .55 (1972). Cf. however, § 2200.53, precluding deposi-
tions of parties and witnesses except by special order of the Commission or a judge serving as
hearing examiner.
3429 C.F.R. § 2200.91 (1972).
35 Under the rules as originally promulgated, the Commission adopted stringent standards
for granting review closely analogous to the standards applied by the NLRB in requests for
review of Regional Director's determinations in representation cases. For example, petitioner
had to establish that a substantial question of either law or policy was involved under § 2200.42.
However, the new rules recently promulgated are silent as to the basis upon which "discretion-
ary review" will be granted in § 2200.91. Note also that any one Commissioner can direct
that a judge's decision be reviewed according to OSHA § 12(j).
36 Moran, note 30 supra.
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ate court of appeals is available as of right 7 upon the timely filing of a
petition within 60 days from issuance of the order.3
B. Comparison with NLRA
Based on the foregoing outline, certain general observations can be
made by the labor practitioner familiar with the manner in which the
NLRB functions. Thus, like the General Counsel under the NLRA, the
Secretary serves as the investigator of complaints and the prosecutor inso-
far as such investigations demonstrate violations of OSHA. So too, in con-
tested cases the party respondent is entitled to an evidentiary hearing be-
fore an independent tribunal ("judges" assigned to OSHRC). Unlike
the NLRA, however, aggrieved parties are not entitled to Commission re-
view as of right and, further, insofar as judicial review is concerned, the
aggrieved party must file a timely petition for review or else the OSHRC
order will automatically become final and binding." In large measure, it
would seem evident that OSHA's emphasis on "finality" and strict time
limits for invoking judicial review reflect the Congressional decision to ac-
commodate "due process" considerations with the pressing reality that
time is of the essence in protecting employees against exposure to unsafe
or unhealthy working conditions.
There exist some even more fundamental differences. First, while
the NLRA prohibits certain specific, defined practices of employers and
labor organizations, OSHA does not. As noted, it merely places in the
Secretary's hands the responsibility and open-ended authority to promul-
gate such safety and health "standards" 40 as are deemed necessary and
to cite employers for violations. Second, the roles of the two statutes are
reversed insofar as remedies are concerned. The NLRA does not pre-
sume to establish an all inclusive list of available remedies.41 Congress
chose, instead, to provide the Board with a broad grant of discretionary
authority to take such affirmative action as would effectuate the policies
of the Act, to be exercised in light of the facts of each particular case.
3729 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
38 Cf. id. §§ 660(a), (b). A broader choice of forums is available to the "persons ag-
grieved" by an OSHRC order (they can file in the D. C. Circuit as a matter of right) than is
available to the Secretary if he is the petitioning party.
39ld. §§ 660(a), (b). Under the NLRA, by contrast, Board orders are never self.enforc-
ing. Thus, even if a respondent company chooses not to petition for review, the Board is obli-
gated to seek enforcement of its order in an appropriate circuit court. Absent such a decree,
the continued refusal to comply with a Board order does not subject a respondent to citations
for civil or criminal contempt.
40 Of course, as noted above, insofar as toxic substances and harmful physical agents are
concerned, the Secretary is mandated to set the standards which meet the requirements of §
6(b) (5).
41 See, e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953) ("Section 10(c)
of the Taft-Hartley Act... charges the Board with the task of devising remedies to effectuate
the policies of the Act.... [T]he power... is a broad discretionary one .... ").
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OSHIA, on the other hand, contains a very comprehensive and highly struc-
tured set of rules governing assessment of civil and/or criminal penalties.
OSHA and the NLRA proceed down divergent paths in still other re-
spects. Whereas the latter, of course, proscribes certain unfair labor prac-
tices attributable both to employers and labor organizations, -42 only em-
ployers are subject to the strictures of OSHA: labor organizations are not,
except to the limited extent that they too serve as "employers." This re-
flects the reality that safety is a managerial function and responsibility, as
has long been recognized both in the basic policy underlying workmen's
compensation legislation and the collective bargaining relationship.4! 3
Employees are admonished to comply with safety and health standards,"
but are not subject to being named as party defendants. Undoubtedly, in
making this conscious decision, Congress was aware that employers would
not be left without recourse. The normal disciplinary procedures can be in-
voked insofar as any employee refuses to comply with any reasonable di-
rective relating to safety matters generally or standards in particular.
Further, union lawyers may wish to savor, and their management coun-
terparts contemplate warily, the fact that, under OSHA, Congress con-
ferred upon labor unions" a much more expansive opportunity to partici-
pate actively in all stages of compliance and enforcement than is the case
with respect to "charging parties" under the NLRA. While statistics per
se are often misleading, just by virtue of the number of times that OSHA
expressly confers upon labor organizations participatory rights while func-
tioning as the employees representative, it appears that Congress has cre-
ated a situation unparalleled in any other labor legislation.46
This brief description highlights the obvious fact that OSHA is des-
tined to generate a substantial challenge to the labor bar. For purposes
of this paper, we shall confine ourselves primarily to the legal problems
attendant to compliance. This seems appropriate for several reasons: the
4229 U.S.C. §§ 657(a), (b).
43 [C]ollective bargaining agreements regulate or restrict the exercise of management
functions; they do not oust management from the performance of them. Management
hires and fires, pays and promotes, supervises and plans. All these are part of its
functions ....
Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation, 363 US. 574, 583 (1960). So too, safety and
health, along with the above mentioned specific subject matters, are functions of management.
See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co., XI STEEL ARBITRATiON AWARDS 8171 (1963); STEELWORKERS
HANDBOOK ON ARBITRATiON at 939-41 (Pike & Fisher 1970); ci. Bryant v. United Mine
Workers, 81 L.R.R.M. 2401 (6th Cir., Sept. 26, 1972).
4429 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1970).
45 OSHA talks in terms of the "representative of employees," which in a sense has broader
(and perhaps even more genteel) connotations than does "labor union." For purposes of this
paper, however, I shall resort to the more familiar term "labor union" and assume, further, that
where used it refers to either a representative "certified" pursuant to an NLRB order, or a rep-
resentative lawfully recognized by an employer as exclusive agent for an appropriate unit of
employees.
4 6 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 355(b) (1), 356(a) (1), 357(c) (3), (e), (f) (1), 359(a), (c)
(1970).
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inspection lies at the heart of the Act, and, further, it is at this stage in
the proceeding that we can expect substantial demands for legal advice
from labor and management clients alike.
One preliminary caution.: in. embarking upon this new experience, it is
not enough just to have the literal language of the Act at your disposal.
Life under OSHA is not destined to be that simple. The Secretary has
issued extensive regulations elaborating upon the manner in which he plans
to carry out his responsibilities under many sections of the statute47 and, as
if to compound the intellectual challenge, a third has been added in the
form of an imposing Operations Manual containing even more detailed
information on this same topic. Irrespective of whether one would agree
that the contents of the latter two documents are in all respects consistent
with the statutory language, 48 they are on the "required reading list" in
order to understand fully how the Secretary is administering the Act.
C. Translating the Act Into A Living Reality
1. Self-policing
Insofar as the all important problem of enforcing occupational health
and safety standards is concerned, Congress essentially made two judg-
ments. It recognized the need for a formal mechanism whereby an em-
ployee (or his bargaining agent) who believed that a violation of a stan-
dard existed which threatened physical harm could so notify the Secretary
and thereby invoke the compliance processes of the Act, commencing with a
special inspection. But Congress was equally cognizant that, from a prag-
matic standpoint, this formal, time-consuming, quasi-adjudicatory process
could not by itself offer a workable solution. As noted, an estimated four
million establishments and facilities with 57 million employees are current-
ly covered by the Act. In contrast, the 1973 federal budget provides funds
for only about 600 inspectors and, more importantly, less than 100 indus-
trial hygienists who alone have the technical expertise to test for toxic
substances and harmful physical agents. There is thus no way for the
available manpower to effectively enforce the existing 400 standards for
toxic substances, let alone to conduct all the regular and special inspections
under §§ 8(a) and (c) (1) of the Act.49  Obviously, this means that many
4 7 d. § 657(g) (2).
48 Indeed, a cynics delight for wiling away the late evening hours is to follow this course:
first read the Operations Manual; next cross reference the regulations and, upon satisfying
yourself that the Manual is true to the words of the regulation, then analyze whether the Man-
ual nonetheless fails to satisfy the language of the Act itself.
40 Precisely because of this manpower shortage, the Secretary has established a priority sys-
tem pursuant to § 6(g) for conducting inspections under which the following order is applil.
cable: first, catastrophy and/or fatality inspections; second, complaints alleging violations; third,
inspections of certain specified target industries; and fourth, general inspections and related
activities.
The target industries program was developed in pursuance of OSHA's goal to deal with the
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work places will not be scheduled for a regular government inspection for
years, if ever, in the normal course of events10
All the foregoing prompted Congress to make extensive provision for
self-policing by employers as a meaningful supplement to the formal en-
forcement process. It did so on the basis of a reasonable assumption that
employees and their union representatives would serve as the Secretary's
"eyes, ears, nose and throat" for purposes of observing daily whether their
employers were complying with the Act. The self-policing principle oc-
cupies a prominent place in the OSHA scheme. Thus, § 8(c) (1) provides
that the Secretary shall issue regulations requiring employers, through the
posting of notices or other appropriate means, to keep their employees in-
formed of the protections accorded by OSHA, including the applicable oc-
cupational safety and health standards.
It would appear that the Secretary has not fully complied with this man-
date. Instead of requiring that employers obtain and post copies of appli-
cable standards, as the statute dictates, the Secretary by regulation has sub-
stantially diluted this obligation by providing, in 29 C.F.R. § 1903.02(c) (1)
(1972), that only "if an employer has obtained copies of [applicable stan-
dards] he shall make them available upon request to any employee or his
authorized representative .... " From a practical standpoint this could well
make a crucial difference. For if, as explained, employees are to serve in
a "watch dog" capacity in enforcing safety and health standards, they must
have ready access to their contents. Nor should the right to such vital in-
formation hinge upon the mere happenstance of whether the employer de-
cides to obtain copies for his use."
Each employer is also obligated to "make, keep and preserve, and make
available to the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of HEW, such records
regarding his activities relating to the Act as the Secretary . . . may pre-
scribe by regulation as necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of
the Act or for developing information regarding the causes and prevention
of occupational accidents and illnesses. 2
With respect to work-related deaths, injuries or accidents (other than of a
minor nature), OSHA places broad authority in the hands of the Secretary
to impose, by regulation, the requirement that employers maintain accurate
records and make periodic reports to the Secretary under § 8(c) (2).
"worst-first" within the resources available. In 1972 efforts were concentrated on the five in-
dustries with the highest reported injury-frequency rates: namely, longshore; lumber and wood
products; roofing and sheet me-.al; meat and meat products; and mobile homes and other trans-
portation equipment. Operating Manual, 2 O.S.H. REP. 77, at 2302-03 (BNA 1970).
5o See, e.g., JOB SAFmY AND HEALTH AcT OF 1970, supra n. 4, at 44.
5 1 Of course, the possibility exists that the Secretary might be vulnerable to a mandamus
action to challenge his refusal to require employers to obtain and post applicable standards.
But this alternative suffers from an obvious shortcoming-it places an unnecessary burden on
employees and their agents to invoke costly, time-consuming litigation.
5229 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1) (1970).
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This same basic theme is carried forward and, indeed, expanded insofar
as exposure to toxic substances and harmful physical agents is concerned.
Congress was keenly attuned to the need to place meaningful requirements
on employers, supplemented by the right of employees (and their union)
to know what dangers they were being subjected to in their work places.
Thus, once an employer is required to monitor or measure employee expo-
sure to a toxic substance (for example, asbestos dust), the Secretary is obli-
gated to promulgate regulations which provide the "employees or their
representative with an opportunity to observe such monitoring or measur-
ing and to have access to the records thereof. '"5 3 Even more far reaching is
the provision imposing on employers the affirmative duty to notify all em-
ployees exposed to toxic substances or harmful physical agents at levels
which exceed those proscribed by the standard and, further, to advise them
"of the corrective action being taken. ' 54  In a nutshell, § 8(c) (3) pre-
cludes employers from keeping employees in the dark about the true di-
mensions of their pollution plight. The ingenuity of this legislative
approach is readily evident: it is designed to minimize resort to formal pro-
cedures by placing heavy stress on prompt resolution of environmental pol-
lution problems through normal industrial relations channels after em-
ployees and unions have notice concerning the real facts.
2. Enforcement
Assume that an employee or labor union "believes" that there exists a
violation of the general duty clause or a safety and health standard which
threatens physical harm, or an "imminent danger" is present. Either party
may request an inspection of the workplace by notifying the OSHA Area
Director in writing." Precisely because Congress did not want blue
collar workers to be held accountable to any technical "pleading"
rules, it required only that parties set forth with "reasonable particularity
the grounds for the notice.""0 The notice must be signed by the employee
or his union; to assure that employers are placed on notice of the alleged
violation, a copy must be provided to the employer no later than at the
time of inspection. An individual employee or group of employees may
believe that it is in their best interest to remain anonymous so as to avoid
the wrath or perhaps even the disciplinary arm of an unenlightened em-
65329 U.S.C. § 657(c) (3) (1970).
54 Id.
55 If an employee places a telephone call to a Regional Office, he will be requested to reduce
the oral notice of violation to writing; to further assist the employ,- in satisfying governmental
"red tape," the Region is under instruction to forward the necesary "forms" to such person.
Operations Manual, 2 O.S.H. REP. 77, at 2702 (BNA 1970).
5029 U.S.C. § 357(f) (1) (1970); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1903.11(a) (1972).
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ployer57 If so, they may request that the copy furnished the employer not
contain their names and the Secretary is obliged to honor that request.3
Upon receipt of the notice in the Regional Office, if the Area Director
determines that an inspection is warranted he shall direct a "special inspec-
tion" to be conducted "as soon as practicable." In making this determina-
tion, the familiar test of "reasonable ground to believe" controls. Since
this is a very liberal test, it may be anticipated that, in the vast majority of
cases, if any employee has written an intelligible complaint which on its
face refers to an alleged existing safety or health hazard, a special inspec-
tion will result. On those occasions in which a determination is made not
to go forward, even to the extent of conducting an inspection, the Area Di-
rector is required to notify the employee and his union in writing accord-
ingly.6 9 Union lawyers may well be consulted at this stage and it is im-
portant to note that they have an avenue of appeal remaining; the com-
plaining party may obtain review of that determination by submitting a
timely written statement of position to the Regional Administrator. Fur-
ther, the Regional Administrator, at his discretion, may also act favorably
on a request for an informal conference in which all interested parties, in-
cluding the employer, participate. Under the Secretary's regulations the
Regional Administrator's decision "shall be final and not subject to further
review." 60
By analogy to the settled case law under the NLRA holding that the de-
cision of the General Counsel against issuing an unfair labor practice com-
plaint is unreviewable, 61 it would appear that any litigant would face a sim-
ilar uphill struggle in trying to persuade a federal district court to review
the Regional Administrator's refusal to inspect. At best, the only conceiv-
able basis for seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction would be if the em-
ployer's alleged violation was serious in nature, posing a threat to human
life or limb, and the Administrator's refusal was provably egregious and un-
justifiable. In those limited and unusual circumstances, many courts would
be reluctant to hide behind the protective umbrella of "no jurisdiction,"
especially where an informal session in chambers might persuade the Sec-
retary to conduct an inspection after all.
Assuming that an inspection is to take place, a variety of legal consider-
ations emerges. Quite naturally, the first concern of the employer's counsel
is what advance notice his client is entitled to, if any. The statute deals
with this practical question in an interesting, albeit indirect, fashion. The
5 7 But see id. § 660(c)(1) (precluding acts of recrimination against employees who exer-
cise their rights under OSHA) : see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (64)
(1970).
5829 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1970).
59Id.; see also 29 CF.R. § 1903.12 (1972).
60 29 C.F.R. § 1903.12 (1972).
6 1 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1961).
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compliance and enforcement provisions, where one would expect to find
guidance, are silent as to advance notice. But § 17(f), relating to pen-
alties, provides that "any person who gives advance notice of any inspec-
tion to be conducted . . without authority from the Secretary, or his de-
signee, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than
$1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both."2
From this, the Secretary has divined that Congress intended that in
promulgating rules regarding advance notice, two competing considera-
tions should each be accorded some weight. On the one hand, a general
prohibition would help to insure that employers would not have the oppor-
tunity to make last minute desperation adjustments of a minor or tempo-
rary nature, creating the misleading impression that no problem exists when
the realities are to the contrary. The countervailing consideration is that
the purpose of the Act is to cure defects before injuries occur and, in certain
circumstances, advance notice might be consistent with that objective-
for example, in cases of apparent imminent danger should the object be to
encourage the employer to abate as quickly as possible.
The outcome of the balancing process invoked by the Secretary mani-
fests itself in § 1903.6 of the regulations, supplemented by the Operations
Manual. 03  In essence, the Secretary has established a general policy of not
authorizing "broad" use of advance notice, subject to conferring upon the
Area Director or the Compliance Safety and Health Officer (that is, the
inspector or "CSHO") discretion to do so in certain defined circum-
stances64 and/or whenever "the Area Director determines that giving of
advance notice would enhance the probability of an effective and thorough
inspection." ' The evident difficulty with the foregoing is that it is all
things to all people. The open-ended nature of the above quoted "excep-
tion" literally invites extended resort to advance notice; it is very hard to
square with the more general policy against such advance notice. This
confusion is compounded when we analyze the specific circumstances which
the Secretary has deemed to constitute valid bases for granting advance
notice. Thus, common sense-let alone the realities of industrial life--
would seem to dictate that some authorized representative of the employer
should be present on the premises at all times that the plant is operating.
0229 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1970).
63 Operations Manual, 2 O.S.H. REp. 77, at 2501-13 (BNA (1970).
64 Advance notice of inspections may not be given, except in the following situations:
(1) In cases of apparent imminent danger, to enable the employer to abate the dan-
ger as quickly as possible; (2) in circumstances in which the inspection can most effec-
tively be conducted after regular business hours or special preparations are necessary
for an inspection, or (3) if necessary to assure the presence of representatives of the
employer and employees or the appropriate personnel needed to aid in the inspection.




Yet, incongruous though it may be, the Secretary has authorized resort to
advance notice, inter alia, "where necessary to assure the presence of repre-
sentatives of the employer." 6 In any event, this much is clear: if advance
notice is given, it is the employer's responsibility to promptly notify the
union as well, 7 and such advance notice shall not exceed 24 hours except
in cases of apparent imminent danger and "other unusual situations"-
which presumably means situations not usual-whatever that means!"
3. The Walk Around
Section 8 (e) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that
a representative of the employer and a representative authorized by his em-
ployees shall be given an opportunity to accompany the Secretary or his au-
thorized representative during the physical inspection of any workplace
... for the purpose of aiding such inspection.
While to the outside observer this simple, declarative statement hardly
seems noteworthy, the fact is that § 8(e) gave rise to an emotion packed
donnybrook which ultimately culminated in a victory for labor. Irrespec-
tive of whether an employer opts to participate in the active inspection, he
cannot interfere with the employee representative's right to do so.
At stake from management's standpoint was its cherished property
right to determine which "outsiders" should be permitted entry into its
hallowed halls. Labor organizations were equally adamant that the right
to participate in the so-called "walk around" inspection was absolutely es-
sential both to insure vigorous, comprehensive scrutiny of the plant and
to counteract the lingering suspicion that otherwise only management's
"version" of the conditions in the plant would be articulated to the federal
inspector. The legislative resolution reflected in the above quoted lan-
guage is a testimonial to the fact that Congress consciously chose to accord
bargaining unit employees, through their representatives, direct participa-
tion in the most crucial aspect of enforcing the Act-the walk around in-
spection.
In the bill passed by the House, the employees' representative was al-
lowed to go along on the inspection only if the employer representative
did so. However, the conferees rejected this in favor of the Senate provi-
sion which ultimately was enacted as § 8(e). Of particular significance is
the following explanation of the need for this provision as contained in
Senate Labor Report No. 91-1282:
In order to carry out an effective national occupational safety and health
program, it is necessary for government personnel to have the right of en-
66Id In, this connection, one might be curious to know to what extent advance notice has
been predicated on this rationale and, further, the impact such notice has had on the effective-
ness of such inspections.
67 Id. § 1903.6(b).
6S Operations Manual, 2 O.S.H. REP. 77, at 2502 (BNA 1970).
19721.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
try in order to ascertain the safety and health conditions and status of
compliance of any covered employing establishment. Section 8(a) there-
fore authorizes the Secretary or his representative, upon presenting appro-
priate credentials, to enter at reasonable times the premises of any place
of employment covered by this act, to inspect and investigate within reason-
able limits all pertinent conditions, and also to privately question owners,
operators, agents or employees.
During the field hearings held by the Subcommittee on Labor, the com-
plaint was repeatedly voiced that under existing safety and health legisla-
tion, employees are generally not advised of the content and results of a
Federal or State inspection. Indeed, they are often not even aware of the
inspector's presence and are thereby deprived of an opportunity to in-
form him of alleged hazards. Much potential benefit of an inspection is
therefore never realized, and workers tend to be cynical regarding the thor-
oughness and efficacy of such inspections. Consequently, in order to aid
in the inspection and provide an appropriate degree of involvement of
employees themselves in the physical inspections of their own places of
employment, the committee has concluded that an authorized representative
of employees should be given an opportunity to accompany the person
who is making the physical inspection of a place of employment under
section 9(a). 69
The manner in which the Secretary has decided to implement the §
8(e) inspection raises some interesting questions. First, as noted, the stat-
ute provides that "a" representative of the employer and "a" representa-
tive of the employee shall be given an opportunity to accompany the
Compliance Safety and Health Officer. Since as a practical matter there
may well be situations in which it would be desirable to have more than
09 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 141 (emphasis supplied). Notwithstanding the
fact that employees thus have a statutory right to participate in the walk around inspection, some
employers have refused to compensate them for time spent on inspections conducted during
working hours. In one such instance, the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International
Union filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor on behalf of the employees it represented
at the Paulsboro, New Jersey, refinery of the Mobil Oil Corporation. OCAW sought to invoke
the Secretary's authority to bring a suit in federal district court for an employee who has been
discriminated against by an employer "because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of
himself or others of any right afforded by [OSHA]" under §§ 11 (c) (1), (2).
Essentially, OCAW argued that an employee engaged in aiding a federal inspector was per,
forming a service which is an inherent part of the employer's business. According to the
OCAW, time devoted to aiding an inspector in checking and evaluating whether the employer's
machinery and equipment are in a safe condition should have ben treated identically to time
devoted by mechanics and repairmen who service the same equipment daily to insure its safe,
operative condition. There was no dispute that by failing to compensate the employee repre,
sentatives, Mobil Oil had effectively imposed a financial penalty upon those persons for having
exercised their statutory right to participate in the walk around inspection.
Nevertheless, in a memorandum opinion issued by the Solicitor of Labor on March 1, 1972,
the Secretary declined to initiate any lawsuit against Mobile Oil Corp., 1 O.S.H. R13P. 962 (BNA
1972). Rather, the Secretary found that "an employee participating in the walk around is not
engaging in normal work activity" and, therefore, it was not discrimination within the meaning
of § 11(c) (1) for Mobil Oil to refuse to pay the employee for time spent in that activity. In
so holding, the Secretary stood the legislative history of OSHA on its head by reaching the dia,
bolical conclusion that the principal beneficiaries of the walk aroand are the employees them-
selves and therefore they should be prepared to pay for these benefits. It is anticipated that
union counsel will soon file a lawsuit to challenge this result.
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one representative present from each of the respective interested parties,
the regulations properly accord the CSHO discretion to permit "addition-
al" employer and employee representatives to participate if such par-
ticipation will "further aid the inspection. '"," The regulation thus expands
a basic tenet expressed on the face of § 8 (e)-namely, equal treatment for
all interested parties insofar as the walk around is concerned. Yet, it is my
understanding that certain CSHO's have permitted substantial numbers of
management representatives to accompany them on a plant inspection tour
while simultaneously limiting the employees to one representative. Of
course, additional company plant personnel may prove helpful to the in-
spector; with this judgment one cannot quarrel. But the failure to pursue
a similarly liberal policy with respect to employee representatives is dis-
quieting and inexplicable.71 It runs contrary to the spirit of the statute,
and is also self-defeating insofar as the Secretary's objective is to insure
effective safety and health programs. Thus, it seems clear that the in-
spector will be aided both by the presence of a local union safety commit-
teeman employed in that plant and, for example, a safety engineer or in-
dustrial hygienist who works for an international union with which that
local is affiliated. The regulations plainly contemplate the participation
of such so-called "third parties,"7 - but the problem is that CSHO's may
mistakenly assume that if they permit such third party participation in the
walk around, it is in lieu of any other authorized employee representative.
Second, the Secretary has established a controversial procedure for a
conference at the close of the inspection between the CSHO and the owner,
operator or employer representative. At that closing conference the
CSHO will advise management concerning "all conditions and practices dis-
closed by the inspection which may constitute safety or health violations.""3
Yet, no employee representative is permitted to attend this all important
session at which the inspector imparts to management the tentative results
of his tour of the plant. The Secretary has provided only that upon request
the CSHO will engage in a separate "generally responsive discussion" with
the employee representative.74 What this entirely nebulous phrase means
is debatable; to the employee organization the only satisfactory "respon-
sive discussion" would be one in which a CSHO repeats the substance of
70 29 C.F.R. § 1903.8(a) (1972).
7 Certainly, since the CSHO has authority to deny the right of accompaniment "to any per-
son whose conduct interferes with a fair and orderly inspection" under 29 CF.R. § 1903.8(d)
(1972), the Secretary is already protected adequately against the possibility of disruptive be-
havior, an unwieldy number of representatives, or any other potential abuse resulting from the
walk around. In point of fact, we are not aware of any reported incidents where such abuse
has occurred.
72d § 1903.8(c).
7 3 Operations Manual, 2 O.S.H. REP. 77, at 2521 (BNA 1970).
74Id. at 2522.
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their prior comments to management at the dosing conference. But it is
highly doubtful whether CSHO's consider themselves bound to do so.
The rationale upon which the Secretary relies in barring the employee
representatives from the closing conference-that "they will already have
communicated and participated with the CSHO during the inspection"
-totally misses the mark. It fails to come to grips with the employee
representatives's need-indeed right-to know the outcome of the CSHO's
inspection. Perhaps even more important is the psychological impact of
separate "behind closed doors" meetings between the CSHO and manage-
ment. An inevitable consequence of this procedure is to breed suspicion
in the minds of the employee representatives that management will per-
suade the inspector that, for example, he erred in certain respects in his
tentative evaluation, or that certain ostensibly "serious" violations are in
fact insignificant. Irrespective of whether such concerns are well-
founded, 5 the fact remains that they will persist. This procedure thus
places the CSHO in the unfortunate position of appearing to deal pri-
vately with the employer to the potential detriment of the employees.
Paradoxical though it may seem to the employees directly concerned,
the Secretary's exclusionary policy concerning dosing conferences is omi-
nously reminiscent of the pre-OSHA problems caused by the exclusion of
employee representatives from the walk around inspections. The decision
to subordinate the interests of employee representatives for purposes of the
closing conference is inconsistent with the provisions in the OSHRC regu-
lations which at least by strong implication suppo.rt the principle that a
labor organization is a necessary party to any formal settlement under the
Act.70  If a labor organization's approval is ultimately needed to settle a
case once a violation is charged, a fortiori it should be entitled in the first
instance to information concerning what the case is all about.
The Secretary might attempt to explain his exclusionary policy on the
ground that labor organizations might use the information acquired in the
dosing conference to achieve some nefarious labor-management relations
goals. But this is sheer conjecture. It is symptomatic of the Secretary's
more general shortcoming in fearing and adamantly resisting any recogni-
tion that OSHA is and will continue to remain an integral fact of life in
labor-management relations, just as is the NLRA
The scope of inspection will generally be explained by the CSHO at
the opening conference to be held promptly upon his arriving at the plant
75 The "CSHO shall make no statement which could be construed as committing the depart-
ment to issuing or not issuing a citation with respect to an apparent violation." Operations
Manual, 2 O.S.H. REP. 77, at 2521 (BNA 1970).
76 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.5 (a), .23 (1972).
7 Operations Manual, 2 O.S.H. REP. 77, at 2509 (BNA 1970). One of the numerous ways
that the Secretary's position has manifested itself is through the directive that inspections will
be initiated at struck plants only with the prior approval of the Area Director.
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to be inspected. If the union plans to participate in the walk around, it
should take appropriate steps to insure its presence at this opening confer-
ence.78  In essence, the following fundamental principles will apply:
(a) The CSHO has broad authority, inter alia
to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other rea-
sonable times and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner,
any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures,
machines, apparatus, devices, equipment and materials therein... 7-
(b) In furtherance of this "rule of reason," the CSHO may, under
compulsion of law, require employers to produce relevant records, mate-
rials and/or witnesses.8" He is also directed to check whether the employer
has satisfied his statutory duty of posting applicable informational notices
to the employees. 8 '
(c) When acting on a complaint, the CSHO should not restrict him-
self to the specific conditions alleged; he should inspect the entire facility
or workplace, unless time does not permit. This means that in the course
of the walk around any employee has the right to bring any condition
which he believes violates a standard or the general duty requirement to
the attention of the CSHO 2 Further, as a practical matter, it means that
it is incumbent upon a labor organization desiring a comprehensive inspec-
tion to impress upon the CSHO the need to "find sufficient time" and re-
sources to pursue such complaints.83
(d) In addition to employee interviews, CSHO's are authorized-in-
deed encouraged-to utilize photographic techniques as a method of record-
ing violations of existing standards 4 and to rely upon direct qreading in-
struments when inspecting industrial hygiene conditions.85 The services
of a qualified industrial hygienist may be requested if the CSHO has rea-
son to believe an in-depth analysis is necessary to uncover alleged health
hazards. Suffice it to say, as the true dimensions of the environmental pa1-
78 Id. at 2510. In situations of p&m employees being represented by one labor organization
and a separate craft unit has been severed and is represented by another, the CSHO should per-
mit each employee representative to accompany him at least in touring that portion of the emi-
ployer's plant in which the employees he represents work (e.g., an IBEXV representative in the
electrical maintenance shop and an industrial union representative in the roling mills). See id.
at 2511-12.
Likewise, where one labor organization represents all the p&m employees, it would se.em
logical and appropriate that the particular local union safety committeeman who has jurisdiction
over a department should accompany the inspector in touring that department and then drop
out of the inspection and have other safety committeemen perform the same function for their
respective departments.
7929 U.S.C. § 657(a) (2) (1970).
so Operations Manual, 2 0.S.H. REP. 77, at 2502-07 (BNA 1970)
8129 U.S.C. § 657(c) (1) (1970).
8 2 Operations Manual, 2 O.S.H. REP. 77, at 2302, 2512, 2515-16 (BNA 1970).
831,. at 2703.
8 Id. at 2518-20.
851d. at 2720-21.
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lution problem surface, labor organizations naturally can be expected to
place increasing emphasis on aggressive enforcement of stringent standards
for regulating exposure to health hazards, toxic substances, and harmful
physical agents.
As noted, § 8(c) (3) requires the Secretary, in cooperation with
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, to issue regulations re-
quiring employers to: (1) maintain accurate records of employee exposure
to potentially toxic materials or physical agents; (2) accord employees or
their representatives an opportunity to observe such monitoring and mea-
suring and to have access to such records; and (3) permit employees access
to records which reflect their own exposure to toxic materials or harmful
physical agents and notify any employee being exposed to excessive con-
centrations of this fact as well as the corrective action being taken. Read
literally, this section offers an extraordinary vehicle for coping with the
grave challenge posed by insidious occupational health hazards. To date
the Secretary has barely begun to face up to the vitally important respon-
sibilities imposed by § 8 (c) (3). In the long run, however, the success or
failure of OSHA may well turn in large measure on the effectiveness of
the Secretary's implementation of this significant provision.
III. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of OSHA is far from exhaustive. It was in-
tended only to serve as a catalyst to awaken the practicing attorney to
the myriad of legal problems created by this landmark legislation. Further,
we have not even paused to consider the impact of OSHA either on the
collective bargaining process in general or on its application to the in-
terpretation and enforcement of safety and health contract provisions.
From an industrial relations perspective, this is unquestionably an integral
part of any evaluation of the import of OSHA.
In dosing, it also should be noted that I have purposefully avoided
lengthy statistical recitations concerning the number of inspections re-
quested and conducted, citations issued, and total dollar value of civil pen-
alties assessed to date. This is not, I submit, the measure of the effective-
ness of the statute: rather the success or failure of OSHA will turn upon
whether it achieves its lofty goal of assuring working men and women
safe and healthful working conditions.
